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"WHIRLWIND
WITHIN A
WHIRLWIND"
Congreve, Restoration Comedy,
and the
Play of History
Will McConnell

jn "Restoration Comedy and its Modern Critics," John Wain
' exempts The Man of Mode from the chaise that all the works
,of Rochester, Scroope, Wycherley, Buckingham, Congreve,
and other Restoration dramatists are marked by what he calls
"incoherence and indecision": "Did not these men...get their lives
into a corresponding mess, matching the mess they made of their
work?.'" And Wain states of The Way of the World, "the whole play
is full of disastrous and jarring changes of mood, owing to the
presence of irreconcilable difference^ (373, italics added).^ Wain's
' John Wain, "Restoration Comedy and its Modern Critics," Essays in Criticism 1 (1951): 378.
^ Significant to the staging of this debate in the decade following the first issue of Essays in
Criticism (1951) is the editorial note of the inaugural (January 1951) issue: "Our three
desiderata [in the acceptance of submissions] are the critical virtues to be found in a supreme
degree in Matthew Arnold's Essays in Criticism (1865). There can, of course, be no question
now of going back to Matthew Arnold. Nevertheless, as the majority of the contributors to
these pages are—and are likely to be—Oxford-trained, it has seemed appropriate to proclaim
in our title an allegiance to the greatest of Oxford's literary critics." For an idea of the
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remarks emei^e from a trope of restoration drama criticism that,
through the force of repetition over a considerable period of time,
continues to exert a significant influence on contemporary views of
both the Restoration period and eighteenth-century scholars'
methodology. For example, Samuel Johnson's interpretation of the
play has geneological affinities with Wain's, and other, more recent
scholars', remarks. Johnson focuses on another aspect of this
"irreconcilable difference" in his essay "Congreve."' For Johnson
"[ejvery sentence is to ward or to strike" {Lives 16). In his view, The
Way of the World enacts an excess of wit that makes Congreve's
characters "commonly fictitious and artificial, with very little of
nature, and not much of Life" (16). Like Wain, Johnson focuses on
wit to support his judgment: "wit is the meteor playing to and fro
with alternate coruscations"; this movement, this violent oscillation
of wit, forms Johnson's final judgment of Congreve: "in mere
confusion there is neither grace nor greatness" (20).
A critical corollary in its implications of moral uncertainty if not
its explicit indictment of the play as an instance of ethical and
aesthetic turpitude is Laura Brown's more recent English Dramatic
Form, 1660-1760.'* According to Brown, the historical development
of Restoration and eighteenth-century dramatic form experiences its
own peculiar interregnum in the work of Congreve. Brown's
emphasis on dramatic form—specifically, on the need of playwrights
to discover or devise "a coherent form" in which to present their
material—provides her with a critical apparatus that highlights
Congreve's emphasis on experimental dramatic presentation, which
she identifies as a search for "a new pattern that will allow for the
exploration of moral values in a social context" (117).^ Similarly,
parameters of the debate in this journal, see also F. W. Bateson's "Contributions to a
Dictionary of Critical Terms," (89-93) and Clifford Leech's "Restoration Comedy; The
Earlier Phase," 165-84, in the inaugural issue; F. W. Bateson's "Second Thoughts: II. L. C.
Knights and Restoration Comedy," 56-67, and William Empson and Norman N. Holland in
"The Critical Forum: Restoration Comedy Again," 318-22, May 1957.
^ Samuel Johnson, "Congreve" in Lives of the Poets: Congreve to Gray (New York:
Doubleday, 1965), 16.
^ Laura Brown, English Dramatic Form, 1660-1760: An Essay in Generic History (New Haven;
Yale Umvenity Press, 1981).
^ For a different reading of Congreve's early experiments with dramatic form, see Knstiaan
P. Aercke's "Congreve's Incognitia: Romance, Novel, Drama?" in Eighteenth-Century Fiction
2 (1990): 293-308. Aercke argues that in Congreve's Incognitia, there can be no question of
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Brown's critical apparatus allows her to identify Congreve's drama as
"a unique and isolated moment" of formal innovation distinguished
"not for the undeniable aesthetic merit of its dramatic experimenta
tion, but for its transience" (117); thus, in the play of history
Congreve's drama occupies a formal and thematic interstice.
Although Brown's reading of Congreve's drama highlights many
of its strengths, her critical assumptions also naturalize the presupposi
tion that history functions in a classically dialectical, Hegelian
teleology. Brown's nearly exclusive reliance upon formal consider
ations foregrounds textual reading at the expense of a reading equally
informed by existing historical information. An example of the
limitations such a reading can impose on the work in question is
Brown's reliance on the inherent progression of "transient" or
conflicted dramatic forms toward the realization of unity. To this
end, she reads Congreve's career as a genealogical progression from
the imperfectly realized or fragmented forms of the first four plays to
the unified final form of The Way of the World.
Perhaps more
important—in its implications for an understanding of the entire
period—Congreve's The Way of the World is itself the preeminent
embodiment of a more encompassing historical progression. As
Brown states, "Congreve's last play, then, is the formal culmination
of the warring [bourgeois and aristocratic] assumptions of transitional
comedy" (134). In her critical schema there is an inherent (and,
therefore, unresolved) tension between a work that is the formal
culmination of its time period, and a work that, in its achievement of
just such representativeness, achieves a singularity that removes it
from the very continuity it supposedly represents. Brown "resolves"
this tension by identifying Congreve's texts as the apex of a
"transitional" phase in history. The historical presupposition of her
entire explication of Congreve's drama is that this "phase" must be
the achievement of a penultimate form since Congreve takes the problem of the relationship
of dramatic form to historical content as Incognitias object of investigation, thereby
suggesting that all form is inherently an acting-out of reality. According to Aercke, "in the
narrator's interpretation, verisimilitude becomes...'the reality of the illusion'," whereas the
voice of the preface speaks of verisimilitude as "'the illusion of reality'" (306). Aercke's
assertion of Incognitia's disregard for "verisimilitude" (in the chiasmatic reversibility of
illusion and reality), as well as Aercke's extension of this disregard to The Way of the World,
IS open to question if we remember that Congreve's dramatic theory, as expressed in
Concerning Humour in Comedy," concerns itself with the difficult explication of
Humour—which is, for Congreve, the difficult path that the real takes toward expression.
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"worked through," as, for example, the sublime moment in Kant's
"Critique of Judgement" is subsumed by the advent of a pure reason,
or the sublime moment in Hegel's aesthetic is burned up in order to
resume this simultaneously non-negative, non-positive moment into
the productivity of a historical—specifically, dialectical—progression.
Thus, in the terms of Restoration dramatic form, the moment that is
Congreve's dramatic "unity" (which is for Brown the "unity" of
"transition") must submit to the inherently moral (teleological)
character of that fragmented forms' progression toward historical,
dramaturgical unity. In its very unity Congreve's drama becomes the
baseness, the depravity of historical progression—that which must
perish in order to allow the progression of the history of drama to
pass a moment of moral intercession. I will explore some of the
consequences of this critical assumption in a discussion of the figure
of the audience and its role in projecting the meaning of The Way of
the World. Before moving to a consideration of both the role of the
audience in the play's initial reception and the figure of "the
audience" in scholars' attempts to understand Congreve, we should
consider some of the implications of Brown's and other critics'
methodologies which have equally important ramifications for an
alternate reading of Congreve: specifically, for the ethical inovement
that encompasses the characters' mode of relations in The Way of the
World.
For Johnson, Wain, Brown and many other critics of Restoration
"libertine" drama, wit becomes a figure for discontinuity that
threatens not only the narrative progression of individual plays but
also the historical progression of drama itself. In The Influence of
Moliere on Restoration Comedy, Dudley Howe Miles asserts that
"[Congreve's] love of word-play, to be sure, led him to endow his
minor characters, the servants in particular, with too much brilliant
wit, but in general his satire, frequently as it might suspend the
action, had some more or less obvious relation to character and
purpose,"' Implicit in Miles' statement, as in much of the extant
criticism of Restoration comedy, is an aesthetics of reception as well
as an unexamined presupposition about the nature of the relationship
among language, the social body, and the a priori appearance of the
'• Dudley Howes Miles, The Influence of Moliere on Restoration Comedy (New York; Octagon
Books, 1971): 128.
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"Real" in linguistic and social structures. Isolating the central
implications of Miles's critique can bring into focus a radically
different reading of Congreve's dramatic works. Firstly, for Miles,
witty servants are not in accordance with the real or the natural. A
corollary implication is that, according to Miles, Congreve aspired to
present this "Real" in the space of the theatre, but his love for a
particular form of dialogue—the havoc-producing witty ex
change—produces insupportable diversions from the exigencies of plot
development. But in his letters as well as his plays, Congreve
deliberately constructs a far less stable structure in the interaction of
the "Real," the social hierarchy, and language than Johnson, Wain,
Brown, and Miles would assert. An assertion as valid as Miles' above
is that Congreve considered women, servants, and male nobility
equally capable of, and in, an exchange of wit. Such a reading revises
the presupposition that the dramatuigical writer merely reflects
existing social discourses in the space of the theatre. This reading
casts Congreve's drama as a Utopian discourse.
That is, the
playwright is using the theatrical experience in order to project a
reality that does not and cannot exist currently among his contempo
raries. Congreve then appears as a visionary with a clear sense of the
necessary, if currently absent, "Real." In this reading, the equanimity
of wit in the dialogic situation of the plays appears a strength—rather
than a fault—of the dramatic form.
The validity of the two variant readings points to the possibility
that both assertions exclude a field of other equally plausable
explications of Congreve's drama, and suggests the need for a re
examination of Congreve's dramatuig;ical aesthetic and practices. In
fact, an examination of his aesthetic theory reveals that Congreve does
not claim to capture "reality" on the stage. In Congreve's "Concern
ing Humour in Comedy," theatrical representation is always a re
presentation of the real, a turning back to the desire for the Real as
a pure presence. In the essay, both linguistic and dramatic representa
tion cannot deliver itself from the epistemological uncertainty of
supplementarity, of re-vision, and must continually return to, reenact, the scene of its failure to inscribe adequately the ground of the
Real:
the distance of the Stage requires the Figure represented, to be
something larger than Life; and sure a Picture may have
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Features lai^er in Proportion, and yet be very like the
Original. If this Exactness of Quantity, were to be observed in
Wit, as some would have it in Humour; what would become
of those Characters that are design'd for Men of Wit? I believe
if a Poet should steal a Dialogue of any length, from the
Extempore Discoune of the two Wittiest Men upon Earth, he
would find the Scene but coldly receiv'd by the Town (6).

Clearly, for Congreve, the Real is not a simple reflection of, and
return to, prevailing social customs and situations. Neither is the
expression of the Real an achieved linguistic or social correspondence
with some a priori truth. Significantly, this aesthetic theory mirrors
the difficult relationship that Congreve constructs among truth, wit,
and humour in his plays. In this complex relationship Congreve's
divergence from the dramaturgical practices of his predecessors and
contemporaries is evident.
Congreve's 1695 letter to Dennis, "Concerning Humour in
Comedy," is an attempt to theorize his aesthetic practices.^ Here
Congreve states that he considers Humour the most important
element in his comedies because it both produces and reflects the
singularity of the individual dramaturgical character: "Tho' I make
a Difference betwixt Wit and Humour, yet I do not think that
Humorous Characters exclude Wit: no, but the manner of Wit
should be adapted to the Humour" (162). In Congreve's dramaturgical
preoccupations wit is secondary to humour; however, humour does
not simply appear. Rather, humour is a product of the dramatist's
skill of representation and analysis: "true Humour cannot be shewn,
without a Dissection of Nature" (165). Although this statement
appears proscriptive, in taking this quotation out of its context I have
given it a far more descriptive, definitive sense than Congreve would
allow himself: "I should be unwilling to venture even on a bare
Description of Humour, much more, to make a Definition of it; but
now my hand is in, I will tell you what serves me instead of either"
(165). Clearly, Congreve's aesthetic theory questions the ability as
well as the claim to reflect reality. The ubiquity of wit in his
' William Congreve, "Concerning Humour in Comedy," in Montague Summers, ed.. The
Works of William Congreve III (Soho: Nonesuch Press, 1923): 161-8. All quotations of
"Concerning Humour in Comedy" are from this edition.
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comedies now sheds a light different from that Miles brings to an
examination of Congreve's aesthetic practice; because wit is available
to so many characters—it crosses gender and class boundaries, for
example—it cannot be, for Congreve, the defining characteristic of
individuality. In light of Congreve's "Concerning Humour in
Comedy," wit's divergence from natural presentation seems far less
relevant than the place of humour and its relationship to wit in
Congreve's plays.
Although Miles finds Congreve's use of wit intrusive in the social
realism of the plays, he suggests that Congreve's dialogue in Way of
the World provides "a give and take" that is more egalitarian than
Moliere's Le Misanthrope: "in Moliere the other persons merely
furnished suggestions for the sharpness of Celimene's wit" [Influence
117). In Miles's account, wit is much more closely associated with
the peculiar power of Truth: it is a clothing of Truth in the dress of
one individual's power of negating other characters' truth-claims.
However, in Congreve's Way of the World, wit is the undressing of
the power to clothe the individual will as Truth. The importance of
this distinction is clear in both Congreve's statements dissociating
"wit" and "humour" in "Concerning Humour in Comedy" and in
Congreve's refutation of Collier in Amendments. Congreve suggests
the singular appearance of humour in the former by way of negative
statement: "Humour is neither Wit, nor Folly, nor Personal Defect,
nor Affectation, nor Habit" ("Concerning" 165). Immediately
following this refusal of a humour that reveals itself fully as a content
of consciousness, he suggests that Humour is not simply the voiding
of another character's presentation of self; rather, it is the appearance
of the "singular": "I take it [humour] to be, A singular and
unavoidable manner of doing, or saying any thing. Peculiar and Natural
to one Man only; by which his Speech and Actions are distinguish'd from
those of other Men" (165; italics in original). The truth of the subject,
the subject's self-identity, then, is not evident by way of the negating
power of wit, which provides the speaker with the power only to
identify a contradictory representation of motive, character, and
action. A character's "humour" is by no means made self-evident
through the exercise of a witty exchange.
The significance of this assertion has enormous implications for
reading Congreve's dramas: "singularity," as a marking of individua
tion, a demarcation of identity, makes its elusive and allusive
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allusive appearance only in the dialogic space that inheres in the
relationship of one character to another. Humour, and thus,
individuality, is the impression produced between or among dialogic
partners. "Singularity" is apparent only in relation to another or
other beings, and thus the truth of the humour is evident only as an
operation of one subject's distancing of the self from others.
Congreve suggests that the appearance of humour is less a reasoned
intellectual judgement, or a correctly perceived/received a priori
Truth-of-character, than an affective, physical experience; "Our
Humour has relation to us, and to what proceeds from us, as the
Accidents have to a Substance; it is a Colour, Taste, and Smell"
("Concerning" 165). Thus, humour cannot be an idea—an object that
the self presents to itself for reflection—so much as an impression
gained in the self's proximity to and, consequently, divergence from,
others. He also states that, like wit, humour is "of infinite variety"
(161). The individuation that "humour" represents appears only
through the trace of another character's individuality; thus, the
appearance of "truth"—in subjectivity as well as in any subject's
agency—is, paradoxically, a social notion of "singularity." This is far
different from the manner in which most of Congreve's
contemporaries dealt with problems of self-reflexivity and the related
possibility of teleological progression. For example, the way in which
Dennis circumvented the problematic relationship between individual
agency and historical progression is clear in Grounds of Criticism in
Poetry: "Now the works of God, though infinitely various, are
extremely regular,"® For Congreve, the source and causality of
Humour remains uncertain: it can be "either...born with us, and so
of Natural Growth; or else...grafted into us, by some accidental
change in the Constitution, or revolution of the Internal Habit of
Body; by which it becomes, if I may so call it, Naturaliz'd"
("Concerning" 163; italics added). The joke on the characterization,
and character of, Waitwell in The Way of the World is a direct
consequence of this theory; in response to constructing an illusionary
character of himself and, so, changing his life circumstances, Waitwell
replies

' John Dennis, "Grounds of Criticism in Poetry" in Edward Miles Hooker, ed.. Critical
Works of John Dennis I (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 1939: 325-73), 335.
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Why Sir; it will be impossible I shou'd remember my
self—Marry'd, Knighted and attended all in one Day! Tis
enough to make any Man forget himself. The difficulty will be
how to recover my Acquaintence and Familiarity with my
former self; and fall from my Transformation to a Reforma
tion into Waitwell. Nay, I shan't be quite the same Waitwell
neither. (II.viii,377)'
Already we can see the difference between Miles' understanding of
the function of wit in Moliere's CMimene and Congreve's notion of
wit in "Concerning Humour." In Miles' explication of wit in Le
Misanthrope, one person (Celimene) possesses the unreciprocated
ability to deflate the others' claim to present the truth—and thus to
know with certainty the truth of both the situation and the
relationship between self and other within a particular situation. For
Congreve, this immanence of the self with the self—the subject who
claims a.self-reflexivity that yet extends to a knowledge of the other's
desires and capabilities—posits the need to consider the relationship
of power to Truth.He approaches these issues in his refutation of
Collier's A Short View of the Immorality and the Profaneness of the
English Stage. Deploying a variety of rhetorical strategies, Congreve
lampoons, satirizes, and analytically critiques Collier's implicit claim
to possess an unmediated power of interpretation: for Congreve, this
is a gesture more to be pitied than laughed at, and yet, dangerous for
the social body. Congreve reads Collier's rhetorical performance as
' This and all subsequent quotations from and references to Congreve's dramatic works are
in Bonamy Dobree, ed.. Comedies hy William Congreve (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1951) unless otherwise noted.
A comparison with the preface to Dryden's Cleomenes will make Congreve's "humour"
more visible. In his criticism of farce, Dryden uses "humour" to signify the ability to vent
his anger through the exposure of truth; "Were I in the Humour, I have sufficient cause to
expose it in its true Colours; but having for once escap'd, I will forbear my Satyr, and only
be thankful for my Deliverance" (219-20). Significantly, the power of an exposition of truth
rests with Dryden—truth as well as the control of that humour that produces truth are his
discretionary possession. Charles O. McDonald ("Restoration Comedy as Drama of Satire;
An Investigation into Seventeenth Century Aesthetics" in Studies in Philology 6 (1964);
522-44) and T. H. Fujimura (The Restoration Comedy of Wit, Princeton; Princeton
University Press, 1954) argue that this position of the wit character's superiority is the basis
of all comedy in the restoration; for McDonald, these authors have an "allegiance to the
Hobbesian theory of laughter from a sense of superiority to the thing or person laughed at"
("Restoration Comedy" 523).
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a gesture in which power and Truth are collapsed into univocal
utterance; thus, Collier's performance is a naive language that does
not concern itself with the relationship between the claim to Truth
(the knowledge of univocal meaning) and the circulatory functioning
of social power. Similarly, in the dedication of The Way of the World,
Congreve identifies the ideality, the simplemindedness, behind the
creation, enjoyment and criticism of type-characters, as well as the
need of critics to interpret all plays according to this moral template
of characterization: "Those characters which are meant to be
ridicul'd in most of our Comedies, are of Fools so gross, that in my
humble Opinion, they shou'd rather disturb than divert the wellnatur'd and reflecting Part of the Audience; they are rather Objects
of Charity than Contempt; and instead of moving our Mirth, they
ought very often to excite our Compassion" (336-7). Despite this
assertion, Congreve broke with the formal protocol of the dedication
in order to assert his objection to those "over-char^'d with Criticism"
(337).
Collier's Short View was a significant target for Congreve's
refutation. W. Heldt attests to the popularity of Collier's work,
which ran through four editions in the year of its publication, and
was rapidly translated into French.But Congreve carried on a more
subtle engagement with Collier; mediated through the stage props
and explicitly mentioned in the dialogue of The Way of the World,
Congreve continues the critique of Collier by questioning the
individual's gap between the inner motivation and the claim to make
God appear in prose or poetry. Immediately following a discussion
of the difficulty of discerning integrity in its close proximity to
opportunity. Lady Wishfort directs Mrs. Marwood to the "Books
over the Chimney—Quarles ['that makes God speak so big in's
poetry', note in Dobree ed.] and Pryn, and the Short View of the Stage,
with Bunyan's Works to entertain you" (379). Clearly, Lady
Wishfort's publicizing of her (moral) reading underscores the division
between the projection of moral observance in her public persona and
the opportunistic ends that "moral observance" serves as her private
motivation.
W. Heldt, "A Chronological and Critical View of the Appreciation and Condemnation of
the Comic Dramatists of the Restoration and Orange Periods'* in Neophilologus 7 (1923):
39-59; 109-28; 197-204.
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These remarks will become more clear if we follow Congreve's
"Amendments of Mr. Collier's False and Imperfect Citations."
Congreve refutes Collier's claim to read Congreve's or others'
motives by the pictures he/they create: "it were very hard that a
Painter should be believ'd to resemble all the ugly faces that he
draws."'^ In the same essay, Congreve also parodies Collier's claim
to unmitigated truth in language:
when Words are apply'd to sacred things, and with a purpose
to treat of sacred things; they ought to be understood
accordingly: But when they are otherwise apply'd, the
Diversity of the Subject gives a Diversity of Signification. And
in truth, he [Collier] might as well except against the common
use of the Alphabet in Poetry, because the same Letters are
necessary to the spelling of Words which are mention'd in
sacred Writ. (174)
The initial distinction between linguistic "Singularity" that is selfevident and the "Diversity" of "Subject" in "Signification" is collapsed
in the impracticality, the impenetrability of a language that lacks the
malleability necessary for multiple uses. In the use of implied rather
than explicit parallelism in the syntactical structure, Congreve is
exercising care in his delineation of the relationship between words
in sacred enunciation and words in the situation of a "diversity of the
subject." Although he does not exclude the possibility of singular
interpretation, neither does he imply that singularity of meaning can
be self-apparent to any individual receiver; in fact, the implied
impossibility of singular interpretation is underscored not only in the
syntactical structure and the gently deprecatory but logical conclusion
of the final sentence in the passage, but also in Congreve's diction:
he uses the past indicative or subjunctive form before "to be" to
indicate the individual subject's reception of apodeictic meaning
("ought"). The delineation of a singular meaning becomes an
impossible duty.
Thus, Congreve presents Collier as lost tvithout knowing he is
lost, wandering—morally, socially, personally^between the masks of
"Amendments of Mr. Collier's FJse aitd Imperfect Citations" in Montague Summers, ed,,
The Complete Works (f William Congreve lU (Soho; Nonesuch Press, 1923: 169-206): 173.
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the critic and the Divine. In effect, Congreve points out to Collier
that he must consider the malleability of his own as well as others'
discourse before truth: "I desire the Reader to consider that it is Mr.
Collier the Critick, that talks at this odd rate; not Mr. Collier the
Divine; I would not, by any means, that he should mistake one for
the other" (179). That is, Congreve presents Collier's inability to
genuflect in his relationship to Truth. Congreve's diction distances
his own heated engagement, through Collier's remarks, with the issue
of truth's relationship to social power, and reveals his care to avoid
simply reproducing the rhetoric he inhabits in order to critique: his
criticism is the "desire" of an individual who attempts to
communicate one of a number of diverse positions in the "diversity"
of "subject" in "signification." Similarly, the use of the first person
singular for the voice of the refutation explicitly identifies the
position of his own criticism as an exercise in the communication of
his personal will, not as an unveiling of uncontested and
uncontestable Truth. A comparison with Kant may serve to clarify
the implications of this linguistic theory before I begin a reading of
Congreve's drama.
In Congreve's post-1694 writing, language is close to a techne in
Kant's sense of the word; because it does not necessarily reflect the
divine, language becomes a tool that simultaneously signifies the
divine and the possibility that language functions at an absolute
distance from the divine. The similarity in their theories of language
is, I think, clear at this point; however, Congreve, in his dramaturg
ical practices, differs from Kant in his portrayal of the efficacy of pure
reason to close the gap between practical and pure reason, and thus,
to allow something like pure reason (or a purified exercise of
judgement, virtue, or subject position) power over the necessarily
social world that dictates practical reason. This distinction between
Kant and Congreve is clear in Congreve's limitation of wit's
effectiveness for establishing social dominance within the plays—speci
fically, witty interchange repeatedly introduces digressive elements in
the narrative structures of the plays. Given Congreve's dramatui^ical
theory and its applications to social issues of interpretation, this
digressiveness is not a fault in the dialogue; rather, Congreve's witty
dialogue suggests a conscious revision of both libertine comedy's
conventions and the relationship between the drama and the social
sphere. The multi-directionality of the witty dialogue in Congreve's
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comedies is related intimately to what Congreve felt was new about
his plays, and also has a direct bearing on the relationship of
characterization to the appearance of the singularity that Congreve
calls "humour." In order to work through some of the implications
of Congreve's shift in perspective, it is necessary to turn to the
problem of reading the audience's response to the initial runs of his
plays. As William Pedicord states, "any appraisal of English drama
and stage history from the Restoration until the close of the next
century has to take into account theatre attendance, the composition
of the audience, and patron's taste, all of which changed greatly
during the span of 140 years."" This problem of reception involves
the company of actors for whom Congreve had constructed particular
roles as well as the physical space for which Congreve had tailored
the performative motilities of his plays. I will present only those
aspects of this history of performance most significant to the thesis I
wish to develop for a textual reading of Congreve's plays.
The conditions surrounding the creation of the 1694 establishment
of a theatre cooperative at Lincoln's Inn Fields are well-documented
by such scholars as Edward A. Langhans, Judith Milhous, Robert D.
Hume, Donald C. Mullin, J.L. Styan, and William Pedicord. Based
on the scant information currently available on the 1694 Lincoln's
Inn Fields theatre, it seems reasonable to conclude that the small,
financially troubled theatre Could ill afford both the space for and the
cost of elaborate stage machinery. In a time of cut-throat competition
with the United Company this fact, coupled with Congreve's
explicitly stated dislike for farce—another popular element of his
contemporaries' stage presentations—suggests that he had to rely more
on innovations in characterization, and specifically, dialogue, than on
the presentation of stage effects to attract patrons to the theatre.
Needless to say, the physical and economic circumstances at Lincoln's
Inn Fields were conducive to Congreve's exploration of dialogic
situation and characterization. Another factor that must have played
a significant role in the structure of Congreve's dramas was the
composition of the company itself. The Lincoln's Inn Fields theatre
cooperative was formed with the most experienced actors in England
" William Harry Pedicord, "The Changing Audience" in Robet D. Hume, ed.. The London
Theatre World, 1660-1800, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979: 236-252),
236.
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at that time, and these actors formed an exceptionally well-constituted
company; however, if they were experienced, the majority of
Lincoln's Inn Fields' widely-known actors were also reaching latemiddle age, and their physical capabilities would not be particularly
well-suited to physically demanding activities in their roles.
These facts would heighten the effects, on the audience, of under
played physicality and over-compensated dialogue. A comparison of
the stage directions for the physicality of scenes in "The Old
Bachelor" and "The Way of the World" is suggestive: although stage
directions are few in Congreve's texts. Act three, scene eight of "The
Old Bachelor" calls for a physical altercation between Bluffe and
Sharper. In contrast, no strenuous physical scenes are expressly
written in the stage directions of The Way of the World. It is probable
that Congreve compensated for the lack of technical devices, as well
as a less physical theatrical experience, by experimenting with the
complexity of dialogue presented on stage. With such a well-rounded
company, Congreve was not limited to constructing stronger roles for
individual characters and/or weaker roles for actors of lesser skill.
This factor is more significant than many commentators on the
Restoration theatre have realized: the situation of relative equality
among the actors' levels of skill and talent, coupled with the need to
rely on the talents of all performers rather than on technical effects
or spectacle, led to a performance situation of give and take, and to
relative equality in the complexity of characterization. This allowed
Congreve to move outside the conventional moral framework of both
the stylized relationship of sentimental hero to heroine to villain in
the sentimental tradition, and the strict adherence to characterizationby-type common to other dramatists working in the humours
tradition. This shift can account for the difficulty of placing
Congreve's dramas in a historical context based on genre classifica
tions, A brief exploration of two contemporary critic's attempts to
account for the reception of the comedies of the 1690s can serve to
isolate specific issues of genre classification for a textual reading of
Congreve's dramas. This textual reading can, in turn, isolate aspects
of the relationship Congreve stages among wit, humour, and the play
of history.
Both Judith Milhous and Robert D. Hume have contributed
extensive and insightful scholarship to explain the situation of
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Lincoln's Inn Fields and that company's relationship to its audience."
Both scholars attempt to account for the sometimes bewildering
reception that accompanies the staging of new plays in the decade
before the eighteenth century. For both Milhous and Hume, the
problem involves positing and/or accounting for "changes" in the
composition of the audience, and both explain this "change" by
formulating assessments of the new plays of that period on the basis
of genre classifications. For example, Milhous states that varying
successes of individual new plays are largely due to the styles of plays
each respective theatre company produced. Because Lincoln's Inn
Fields produced mainly older style comedies—libertine or "cynical"
comedies—and Rich's theatre produced the new, sentimental or moral
comedies, Lincoln's Inn Fields productions "were out of touch with
part of their potential audience."'^ But this explanation does not
account for the extraordinary success of The Old Batchelor in March
1693, and the relative failure of the very similar The Double Dealer
just eight months later (November 1693). Milhous asserts that the
capriciousness of the playgoers' attentions, coupled with the slow
change in the composition of the audience, accounts for the
" See also Harold Love*s "Who Were the Restoration Audience" in Yearbook of English
Studies 10 (1980): 21-44, esp. 25-28, for a helpful discussion of the manner in which the
prologue addressed the audience; Emmett L. Avery's "The Restoration Audience in
Philological Quarterly 45 (1966): 54-61.; A. H. Scouten's "Notes Toward a History of
Restoration Comedy" in Philological Quarterly 45 (1966): 62-70, where Scouten traces the
appearance of sentimental elements of Restoration comedy to Shadwell's 1688 comedy The
Squire of Alsatia; Harry William Pedicord's "The Changing Audience" in Robert D. Hume,
ed.. The London Theatre World 1660-1800 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1979): 236-52, for a broad view of the changes in the audience over the eighteenth century;
Aubrey Williams's An Approach to Congreve (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), in
which Williams reads the audience as inherently Christian, and cites "Congreve's unusual
deployment of religious diction and imagery" (157) in "Love for Love" in support of his view
that playwrites and audiences shared foremost a "schooling in the basic doctrines and precepts
of the Christian religion" (1); and K. M. P. Burton's Restoration Literature (London:
Hutchinson, 1958) for a diversity of opinions on the nature and composition of the
Restoration and eighteenth century audience.
" Judith Milhous, Thomas Betterton and the Management of Lincoln's Inn Fields (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 77. Harry William Pedicord's estimation of the
change in the audience is similar: "There are sufficient grounds for thinking that audiences
did change in quality and taste during these forty years [1660-1700], especially in the 1670s
and 1690s, though the change might be thought of as one in which the stage educated its
public" {London Theatre World 240).
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divergence in attendees' aesthetic tastes (77). Hume differs somewhat
from Milhous, arguing
(a) that "cynical comedy" is not a valid category; (b) that even
if we accept...[this] category, cynical comedy was not dominant
in the 1680s—and was, in fact, disintegrating by 1678; (c) that
a sound view of developments in the 1680s must deal with
recorded revivals as well as with new plays; and (d) that the
comedy of the nineties should be seen as a return to longstand
ing generic norms, not as a reaction against the sex comedies of
the 1670s.
Hume's sensitivity toward the place of revivals in theatre productions
points to a problem with Milhous's theory: plays that compose
Milhous' "old" style continue to be part of the popular repertory of
both theatres (for example, the continued stagings of The Country
Wife)', however, Hume's strategy of explanation—that "the comedies
of the nineties should be seen as a return to longstanding generic
norms —marks his affinity with Milhous' explanation. Both attempt
to account for gaps in contemporary scholars' knowledge of the
composition of the audience or the popularity of the plays by relying
on genre classification. The effect of this strategy is the occlusion of
important affinities and differences of individual plays and playwrights
with and from the traditions upon which they draw- Wherpas
Milhous's explanation overstates Congreve's adherence to the formal
characteristics of such dramatists as Wycherley and Etherege, Hume's
explanation understates similarities between Cqngreve and these
diamatists.
As is clear from an examination of Congreve's
dramaturgical aesthetic, Congreve borrows while subtly, if signifi
cantly, diverging^^ from his predecessors and conternporaries. For the
remainder of the paper, I will use the implications of iny reading of
" Robert D. Hiime, "'The Change in Cotnehy'" in Robert D. Hume, ed., The London Theatre
World 1660-1800 (Carboitdale: §outherp Illinois Univefsity Press, 1979): 102.
" "hJewpess" is a theme that surfaces throughput Congreve's invplvement with the theatre.
For example, ip the dedication of The Double Pealer, Cpiigreve states "1 do not kngw that
1 have bprrowed one Hint of h [plgt] any where" (114); in "Concerning Hnm°ur."
the
theoretical presentation of humpur he states: "1 believe the Subject is intjrely new, and was
never touch'd upon before" (Sutnmers, ed.. Works of William Congreve 10); and in the
prologue to The Way of the World he writes: "Some Plot we think he has, and some new
Thought" (Dobree, ed., 340).
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•'Concerning Humour in Comedy" in order to explore various aspects
of Congreve's dramaturgical and aesthetic relationship to his
contemporaries. Specifically, following Congreve's understanding of
the means by which singularity becomes apparent, I will attempt to
show some of the ways in which Congreve's The Way of the World
asserts its ov^n singularity in its relationship to two of the plays from
which it makes its appearance: Wycherley's The Country Wife and
Etherege's Man of Mode; or Sir Fopling Flutter,
Milhous and Hume argue that the plays of Eincoln's Init Fields,
and therefore, Congreve's drama, represent a return to the generic
norms of an earlier time. However, Congreve's work implicitly
questions such tropes of understanding. In Incognitia, Congreve
displays an awareness of the problems of assigning an identity
between the present and the past through reliance on the textual facts
or narratives that produce history. Similarly, Congreve questions the
expectation that reading provides wisdom or insight in The Old
Batchdor when, in a conversation with Vainglove, Bellmour asserts
that "Wisdom's nothing but a pretending to know and believe more
than yre. really do. You read of but one wise Man, arid all that he
kpew was, that he knew nothing. Come, come, leave Business to
Idlers, and Wisdom to Fools; they have need of 'ern: Wit be my
Faculty" (I,i,25-6), Valentine's attempted withdrawal from the social
sphere into the wisdom of "musty Books" does POt address the
practical necessities of living in the social world (I.i,220); Jeremy's
overturning of "wisdom" marks his speech as an exercise of true
jydgement, even if Valentioe qualifies Jeremy's ability to escape the
implications of his own language: "The Rogue has (with all the Wit
he could muster pp) been declaiming agairjst Wit" (I.ii 223). If here
wisdom is the affectation of wh through reading, and true wit is the
ability to judge such devices of affectation, by the writing of The Way
of the Wodd, wit's relationship to judgement is overturned hy the
vagaries of humpur: the dialogic appearance of humour voids the
efficacy of any one individual's wit to judge and thus, exercise control
over, a plot tfiat wiU seciire the outcome of the spcial situation.'^ A
The appearance of the word humour in the plays indicates Congreve's changing ideas of
the relationship of wit, humour, and judgement. Humour is mentioned four tirnes eacji in
The Old Batchelor and The Double Dealp-^ six times in Love for Lovey and seventeen times in
The Way of the World.
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comparison of aspects of The Way of the World with Etherege's Man
of Mode; or Sir Fopling Flutted'^ will reveal the extent of Congreve's
divergence from this "older" as well as "newer" comedy.
As Kevin Cope states, the problem of the satirist is "the battle of
ideals with experience" which emerges "as a problem of action, a task
for the will."^° In their comedies, Etherege and Congreve share the
desire to explore this terrain; however, each addresses the problem
of the individual's assertion of his or her will differently. In The Man
of Mode, the success of the assertion of individual will occurs along a
geographical division between country and city, and a generational
division between youth and age. These constructs are integral to the
development of the "individuality" of the characters, and offer the
audience a clear means for assessing the identities of the characters.
These distinctions also function in Wycherley's The Country
Wife?^ Pinchwife's ideal of the country, where one can more readily
rely on the difference between truth and appearance, is clear; "Why,
I have married no London wife...at least we are a little surer of the
breed there, know what her keeping has been, whether foiled or
unsound" (I.i,245). Horner, the controlling wit of the play—one,
whose knowledge exposes the affectation of the other charac
ters—captures the ideality of Pinchwife's distinction: "Come, come,
I have known a clap gotten in Wales; and there are cousins, justices'
clerks, and chaplains in the country" (I.i,245). Over the course of the
play, Margery learns to encompass the difference between the two
codes in order to exercise her will; yet, throughout the play, the
characters remain clearly distinct from one another and, as such,
remain types. Despite Horner's ability to control successfully the
situations of his social world (to the end of the play, his eunuch ruse
continues to deceive), Wycherley suggests that Horner's way of life
is limited because he cannot obtain the happiness of Alithea and
Harcourt. As such, their marriage represents the melding of preAll references to The Man of Mode; or Sir Fopling Flutter are from H. F. B. Brett-Smith, ed.,
The Dramatic Works of Sir George Etherege II (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1927): 181-288.
Kevin L. Cope, "The Conquest of Truth: Wycherley, Rochester, Butler, and Dryden and
the Restoration Critique of Satire" in Restoration: Studies in English Literary Culture
1660'1700. 10 (1986): 19-40, 24.
All references to The Country Wife are from Peter Holland, ed.. The Plays of William
Wycherley (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 227-341.
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existing codes into the creation of a middle ground of the country and
the city mores, evident in the final scene;
Lucy.: And any wild thing grows but the more fierce and
hungry for being kept up, and more dangerous to the keeper.
Alith.: There's doctrine for all husbands, Mr. Harcourt.
Har.: I edify, madam, so much, that I am impatient till I am
one.
Dor.: And I edify so much by example, I will never be one.
Spark.: And because I will not disparage my parts, I'll ne'er be
one.
HOT. : And I, alas! can't be one.
Pinch.: But I must be one—against my will to a country wife,
with a country murrain to me!
Mrs. Pinch.: And I must be a country wife still too, I find; for
I can't, like a city one, be rid of my musty husband, and do
what I list.
[Aside.
(V.iv,339)
Despite the social and sexual allusions of the final scene, the
characterizations of Alithea and Harcourt—particularly in their
marriage—retain specific ties to a truth outside the social world in
which they participate: virtue. The language in which Harcourt
expresses his love for Alithea reflects this ideal marriage's connection
with some entity outside the social: in response to a question from
Sparkish, Harcourt tells of a love "above the world," which he places
in the social world of measurement with the qualifying "or the most
glorious part of it, her whole sex" (Il.i 254). However, he later
dresses in the clothing of a pastor in a scene which underscores the
connection of his love to divine truth and virtue (albeit in a comic
way). He loves the "divine heavenly creature," as he states, "with all
my soul" (IV.i,295). The clothing of the parson allows him to
dissimulate in the social world in order to state his truth in a private
manner. His communication retains its ties to a purified realm of
truth outside the social sphere in which it is uttered in order to be
proclaimed.
This characterization and its movement to a realm outside the
social becomes more clear in its affinities with Gibber's Love's Last
Shift. Gibber melds the characters of Horner and Harcourt into
Loveless in order to present a template of the central character's
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conversion; in effect, this requires a heroine whose characterization
is idealized (Amanda).This further stylizes the central character's
shift in perception, and (anachronistically) suggests Wycherley's
reliance on the idealization of the relationship between Harcourt and
Alithea, That is, Alithea and Harcourt retain some notion of the
ability to return to a truth that issues from within, although they
must first master their social world's predilection to lie while
dissimulating—if only, within their own relationship, to leave this
predilection behind. In other words, the existing social worlds of the
town and city are passed through in order to enable them to
reconstruct an alternative relationship in which they can freely
identify their inner motivations to one another, and thus, act on them
freely within the marriage. Thus, when Sparkish asks Harcourt "But
how do you love her?" and Harcourt replies, "With all my soul,"
Alithea answers simply, "I thank him, methinks he speaks plain
enough now" (III.ii,280). Once Harcourt passes through the social
world of dissembling, Alithea feels no need to question the directness
of his speech—the connectedness between his speech and a pure
motivation. Clearly, his dissembling (i.e., his witholding of a
disclosure) is not a lie.^^ In effect, both characters maintain a belief
in the utter simplicity of the inner truth. That is, by the final scene,
Harcourt and Alithea become figures of the process of judgement that
has been the narrative unfolding of the play.
In Etherege's The Man of Mode, the country/town theme is also a
prominent feature in the characterization. References to the division
of characteristics along geographical and generational distinctions are
numerous. For example, when the Orange woman alludes to Harriet,
Dorimant thinks of her as a "country toad" {Dramatic Works of
Etheregefi,V)fj\ the Orange woman also reports Mrs. Woodvil's
raillery "against the wild young men of the town" (I.i,192), and
Medley characterizes Mrs. Woodvil as follows: "the Mother's a great
admirer of the Forms and Civility of the last Age" (I.i,193). Other
references abound: Old Bellair states, "Youth will have its jest"
(III.i,223); Lady Townley considers the playhouse and her home a
" As Cibber remarks m the prologue to the play, the wit charaner is the centrepiece for the
first four acts of the play, and is converted in the final act,
" See James Thompson's "Lying and Dissembling in the Restoration" in Restoration: Studies
in English Literary Culture 1660-'1700, 6 (1982); 11-19, for an account of the difference
between lying and dissimulation in Restoration texts.
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"Common refuge of all the Young idle people" (III.u,228); Sir
Fopling Flutter tells Dorimant "Thou art a man of Wit, and
understands the Town" (III.ii,229); Lady Woodvil will return "into
the Country straight" to escape the "wicked Town" (V.ii,281). Like
The Country Wife, The Man of Mode has a clearly defined conceptual
framework that enables its audience an easy access to the moral issues
of the play.
Unlike The Country Wife, however, the central character of The
Man of Mode is morally ambiguous and was perceived as such by
Congreve's contemporaries; Dennis's A Defence of Sir Fopling Flutter
and Steele's Spectator #65 outline two wholly consistent yet
diametrically opposed critical responses to Dorimant's character. This
ambiguity remains at the centre of the play because Dorimant remains
at the centre of the plot. In the resolution of The Country Wife the
central wit character (Horner) is relegated to a minor role as the
marriage between Harcourt and Alithea is given prominence; in The
Man of Mode, Dorimant remains both the central wit character and
the predominant love interest. In other words, the formal denoue
ment of The Country Wife differs significantly from that of The Man
of Mode. Horner's appearance in the "list"^'* of respondents to the
Harcourt/Alithea union (quoted above) symbolically relinquishes the
control his character has exercised over the various plots and
characters in his social world. This difference has important
consequences for a reading of The Man of Mode.
In The Man of Mode, Young Bellair and Emilia represent the
middle ground that Harcourt and Ahthea come to occupy in The
Country Wife-, however, in addition to appearing in every scene but
two,^^ Dorimant remains in control of the unfolding of the plot of
The repetition in the rhetorical structure marks these responses as a "list" in a performance
situation as well as in a textual reading: the flgurality of the characters—their role as
types—would become highlighted in both the content and the form of the language.
Contrary to producing an effect of verisimilitude, in the self-reflexivity of the language the
characters emerge to proclaim themselves flat. The language places them in a position of
supplementarity to Harcourt and Alithea; all those who follow them in linguistic structure
are placed in a position of equality before them and, as such, assert their centrality in the
conclusion of the play.
Dorimant does not appear in Act II Scene II—which presents the dissemblirrg of Young
Bellair and Harriet—and Act IV Scene III—in which Bellinda pays the Chairman for his
complicity.
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The Man of Mode from beginning to end,^^ although Harriet makes the
final volley in their relationship. His schemes prove successful to the
end of the play as a result of his ability to depend on his infallibility
in judging other characters' reactions—so much so that he need not
exercise an adroitness in adjusting to unforseen circumstances. His
incomparable faculty of judgement in both character and situation is
clear in Lady Townley's reference to Medley's character. She refers
and defers to Dorimant's judgement when she describes Medley: "Mr.
Dorimant swears a Flea or a Maggot is not made more monstrous by
a magnifying glass, than a story is by his telling it" (Il.i,207-08). This
control is evident in Dorimant's relationship to the plot. For
example, his manipulation of characters and plot is so successful that
Harriet takes an active part in his plot to humiliate Loveit; as Harriet
tells her, "Mr. Dorimant has been your God Almighty long enough,
'tis time to think of another" (V.ii,286). In fact, it is this final parry
that humiliates Loveit: "Jeer'd by her! I will lock myself up in my
house, and never see the world again" (V.ii,286). Dorimant also
succeeds in winning over Lady Woodvil without a transformation in
his character. As she tells Old Bellair, "If his occasions bring him
that way, I have now so good an opinion of him, he shall be
welcome" (V.ii,287). Only Harriet can match his wit; however,
because Dorimant exerts a predominantly more active control over
the narrative unfolding of the events of the play, the results of his
exercise of wit remain unmatched, if equalled.
More important, in Act II, Scene II, Dorimant's comment
prefigures the state of his relationship with Harriet at the end of the
play: "to say truth, in Love there is no security to be given for the
future" (216); Harriet voices another truth of the play—the second
theme of the plot—which reveals her affinity with the self-awareness
and self-control of Dorimant. As she states of Dorimant, "Some
Men's Verses seem so to the unskillful, but labour i'the one and
The reversal that Loveit effects in Act III, Scene III—Dorimant's "jealousy" and concern for
the damage done to his status when Loveit's attention is focused on the socially maladroit
Fopling—is temporary. In addition, Dorimant remains in complete control of his
presentation of self (and thus, of his true self); as Belinda states, "I have watch'd his look, and
found no alteration there. Did he love her, some signs of jealousy would have appear'd"
(242). Even as the reversal of control occurs, Dorimant confidently reveals that Loveit's
"success" is part of his plot; "had it not been for some powerful Considerations which will
be remov'd tomorrow morning, I had made her pluck off this mask, and shew the passion
that lyes panting under (243).
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affectation in the other to the Judicious plainly appear" (III.iii,234).
This provides an important insight into the relationship of
characterization and plot: both are characters who do not question
their efficacy to control the proceedings in the play. Equally
significant, in the immediate social context in which they appear, each
of the above remarks remains unquestioned by the characters to
whom they are addressed. As something more than utterances in the
diagetic space, these remarks take on a significance beyond the context
of their appearance; thus, in both utterances, the character's voice is
indistinguishable from the outcome of the play. This relationship of
character to plot translates individual wit into narrative power. As
characters, their equality rests in their shared assumption, borne-out
by their experience, that they retain a superior control of and in all
situations. Unlike Horner's relinquished superiority and Harcourt's
and Alithea's ability to relax the vigilance of their control over the
plot, Dorimant's relationship with Harriet is more a sharing than a
relinquishing of his control in both the form and content of the play.
In the characterization of Harriet and Dorimant, the lack of the
need to genuflect is most striking in their initial reactions to one
another. In Act III, Scene III, Harriet's reaction, "I feel as great a
change within; but he shall never know it [Aside]" (235), marks her
as another dissembler; however, the stage command also gives this
speech the mark of truth. This is a truth that, in its form as writing,
blurs the distinction between the utterance as a necessary and
conventional device for the exposure of her inner character to an
audience, and as a testament to her self-possession (in which case there
is no need for her to second-guess herself, since she is not divorced
from "right reason").However, the form her disclosure takes is
Unlike Etherege, Congreve explicitly addresses "right reason" as problematic, which
suggests Congreve's preoccupation with the relationship between social and meta-truths—even
in the formal characteristics of his fiction. If we think of the non-diegetic aside as a reference
to and invitation for the audience's ability to judge, something striking emerges from the
stage directions of The Way of the World. There are two asides in the play; one non-diegetic
and one diegetic. As the most accessible type character. Lady Wishfort speaks the nondiegetic aside; "Oh, he [MirabellJ has Witchcraft in his Eyes and Tonguej^When I did not
see him I cou'd have brib'd a Villain to his Assasination; but his Appearance rakes the
Embers which have so long lain smother'd in my Breast.— [Aside." (V.ix,434), In effect,
not even with Wishfort is Congreve extending to the audience the ability to judge character;
his character's easily identifiable status as a type has placed her in the role of the prejudged,
and so he can allow her an aside. In fact, in a play with no other asides such as hers,
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evidence of her unerring self-awareness, a reading that is supported by
her self-possession in many other instances in the play; that is, like
Dorimant, nowhere is she deluded into making the wrong assumption
of any character or situation. Dorimant's reaction to Harriet does
not share this ambiguity between diegetic and non-diegetic space:
when Dorimant first sees Harriet, he voices his reaction as follows;
"Snatcht from myself how far behind/Already I behold the shore!"
(III.iii,237). The spatial metaphor of self-dispossession identifies that
a fall or a distancing from self (and the "right reason" he possesses) is
an immanent possibility; however, despite the suddenness, the
instantaneousness of the event in which the potential for the
fragmentation of self occurs, the gap that the self would have to
traverse in order to become self-identical is closed in the measurability
suggested by the spatial quality of the metaphor itself. In effect, the
metaphor—the linguistic device for positing reality—hollows out the
potential for a divided subject in the fullness of Dorimant's selfreflexivity. The subject that is identical to 'iX.se\{—even in its fragmen
tation—is the guarantor of narrative control and epistemological truth.
This is a site of a central difference between Etherege's The Man of
Mode and Congreve's The Way of the World. Mirabell's metaphor for
his relationship with Millamant is far different:
To think of a Whirlwind, tho t'were in a Whirlwind, were a
Case of more steady Contemplation...There is no point of the
Compass to which they cannot turn, and by which they are
not turn'd; and by one as well as another; for Motion not
Method is their Occupation (II.vi,375).
This functions less as a metaphor that represents the reality of the
experience than as an allusion to the inability of metaphor to provide
the ground for an epistemologically sound subject position. The
metaphor voids its usefulness to provide a means of measurement;
instead, each allusion points to a lack of descriptive and associative
efficacy. For Mirabell, this leads to the inability to ground himself in
the range of human knowledge: "To know this, and yet continue to
be in Love, is to be made wise from the Dictates of Reason, and yet
preserve to play the Fool by the force of Instinct" (II.vi,375).
Congreve's use of the aside in her case serves to heighten her artificiality.
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Mirabell is not alone in this predicament: at some point in the play,
all the characters must contend with this difficult position in their
relationship to self and other. Waitwell makes this concern with the
self and the self's relationship to the other conscious when, after his
artifice, he cannot return to the same self and cannot with certainty
measure the difference between the two ai.ii).
Perhaps the most comic depiction of this game of selfhood with
itself (and society) is Witwoud's characterization of Petulant:
Why he wou'd slip you out of this Chocolate-house, just when
your Back was turn'd—whip he was gone;—-Then trip to his
Lodging, clap on a Hood and Scarf, and Mask, slap into a
Hackney-Coach, and drive hither to the Door again in a trice;
where he wou'd send in for himself, that I mean, call for
himself, wait for himself, nay and what's more, not finding
himself, sometimes leave a Letter for himself. (I.viii,354)

Implicit in this desperate gesture is the acceptance of the social nature
of the projection of self; that is, much of the construction of the self
both passes through words, like currency, and is projected by
language, as an act of dialogue between two participants becomes a
mutual creation of subjectivity.
For example. Petulant and
Witwoud's escalating linguistic creations of one another collapse this
process into absurdity:
Pet. Witwoud—You are an Annihilator of Sense.
Wit. Thou art a Retailer of Phrases; and dost deal in Remnants
of Remnants, like a Maker of Pincushins—thou art in truth
(metaphorically speaking) a Speaker of Short-hand.
Pet. Thou art (without a Figure) just one half of an Ass, and
Baldwin yonder, thy half Brother, is the rest—A Gemini of
Asses split, would make just four of you. (IV.viii,411)
The chiasmic structure of their exchange simultaneously asserts and
denies the truth content of each assertion. Witwoud's "metaphors"
issue from the activities of real, empirical life; Petulant's "literality"
is drawn, in part, from the fictional world that is Reynard the Fox.
And yet, Witwoud's assertion does annihilate the truth and sense
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certainty of his own statement, as Petulant claims; Petulant does
piece together, badly, remnants of empirical, fictional, and astrological
discourse, as Witwoud claims. Each reflects a truth about the other
of which the self is unaware. An earlier exchange between Mirabell
and Millamant exposes the implications of the need for others to form
the self, as both recognize that interpretation is power;
Mira. You wou'd affect a Cruelty which is not your Nature;
your true Vanity is in the Power of pleasing.
MilU. O I ask your Pardon for that—Ones Cruelty is ones
Power, and when one parts with ones Cruelty, one parts with
ones Power...
Mira. Ay, Ay, suffer your Cruelty to ruin the Object of your
Power, to destroy your Ix)ver—And then how vain, how lost
a Thing you'll be?...For Beauty is the Lover's Gift; 'tis he
bestows your Charms—Your Glass is all a Cheat
(II.iv,372)
If power issues from the social situation—the necessity of one
human being's interpretation of another—the subject that attempts to
withdraw from this necessity, whether by physical withdrawal or
linguistic posturing, is quickly returned to a position where the claim
to an external power is questioned. The attempts of various
characters to assert a non-dialogic truth are ridiculed or ridiculous.
When Mirabell attempts to encapsulate the human condition,
Millamant immediately qualifies his proclamation:
Mir. I say that a Man may as soon make a Friend by his Wit,
or a Fortune by his Honesty, as win a Woman with Plaindealing and Sincerity,
Milla, Sententious Mirabell! Prithee don't look with that
violent and inflexible wise Face, like Solomon at the dividing
of the Child in an old Tapestry Hanging.
(II.v,374)
In (?ffect, Millamant questions his implicit claim to an exclusive moral
stan^. Similarly, when Fainall attempts unsuccessfully to gain Mrs.
Marwpod's compliance (Il.iii), he eventually drops his pretence to
speak "Truth" and asks her to "be persuaded" (367), Perhaps the
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most clear instance of the invalidity of the self-identical statement that
means only what it states—where literality no longer need approach
itself—occurs in the Witwoud/Petulant debate about proof:
Pet. If he says Black's Black—If I have a Humour to say 'tis
Blue—Let that pass—All's one for that. If I have a Humour to
prove it, it must be granted.
Wit. Not positively must—But it may—It may.
Pet. Yes, it positively must, upon Proof positive.
Wit. Ay, upon Proof positive it must; but upon Proof
presumptive it only may. That's a Logical Distinction now.
Madam.
Mrs. Mar. I perceive your Debates are of Importance, and very
learnedly handled.
Pet. Importance is one Thing, and Learning's another; but a
Debate's a Debate, that I assert. (IILxiii,390)
The function of humour in the passage above suggests that
humour, as a singularity of will or of action, intercedes in the
deadlock of logical positionings and of wit. Of the seventeen
mentions of "humour" in the play (one of which is in the prologue),
nine are spoken by Petulant who, at one point in the play, explicitly
marks humour as the intervention that constructs subjectivity: "If I
have a Humour to quarrel, I can make less Matters conclude
Premises,—If you are not handsom, what then; If I have a Humour
to prove it?" (IV.ix,412). Because all of these characters find their
equals in wit as well as their equals in dissembling, there is, for them,
no direct source of truth that is external to wit. This complication
in the traditional dramaturgical relationship of truth to wit and
humour is consistent with Congreve's lack of a clear distinction
between wit and humour in "Concerning Humour in Comedy," and
also suggests that humour, as a singularity (that quality that gives to
the individual his/her distinctness from all other beings) emerges
across the theatrical sign of wit—not in language or in action but in
the enactment of both as it occurs in the dialogic relationship of witcharacter to wit-character. In such a world. Truth is a shared
achievement of the recognition that each character must approach the
other's humour continuously—that humour, truth, wit, and the full
disclosure of subjectivity can shift with'each dialogue that takes place.
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For Mirabell and Millamant, the necessity of defining self-hood
becomes a game of narrating, in the action of the stage, the
relationship with the other in that this movement is an always
postponed definitiveness that refuses to recognize the conventional
strictures of the legal, commercial, and social machinery of marriage.
Thus, Congreve's central characters do not experience a revelation of
truth, i.e., truth itself cannot claim the status of a sign that one
character can wield over another—although this, of course, is part of
all the characters' game of courtship, friendship, and domination. In
this sense, the interaction of wit, humour, and Truth closely
resembles Hans Geoig Gadamer's description of "play" in "Play as the
Clue to Ontological Explanation":
If we examine how the word "play" is used and concentrate on
its so-called metaphorical senses...In each case what is intended
is to-and-fro -movement that is not tied to any goal that would
bring it to an end...rather, it renews itself in constant
repetition. The movement backward and forward is obviously
so central to the definition of play that it makes no difference
who or what performs this movement. The movement of play
as such has, as it were, no substrate. It is the game that is
played—it is irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who
plays it. The play is the occurrence of the movement as
such...In our concept of play, the difference between belief and
pretense is dissolved^*
Millamant's and Mirabell's agreement to renew dissimulation—in
effect, their marriage—is an agreement to remind the other that
neither participant can claim the superiority of a truth that
definitively reveals: 1. the self, 2. the self to the self (because these
characters consider wit to be their distinguishing characteristic, the
exercise of which will succeed each time they attempt to construct the
situation in order to control that situation), 3. the other, 4. the self to
the other, and 5. the other to the self. As Gadamer contends, the
difference between "belief and pretense" dissolves in their
formalization of the movement between these two extremes. For this
Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall
(New York: Crossroad, 1991): 103-04.
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reason, the two must enact a contract with one another rather than
depend on the articulated inner truth of their intentions. After listing
a series of names that will too severely restrain the motility of power
between them, Millamant words this as follows: "Let us never Visit
together, nor go to a Play together, but let us be very strange"
(IV.v,407).^' Their agreement about this "play" between them signals
the acceptance of an epistemological position common to humanity;
for others, such as Witwoud and Petulant, the lack of agreement leads
to increasingly more aberrant forms of attempting to halt the
coruscation by the assertion of one's interpretative power over the
other, and thus withdrawing from the circuituity of any relationship
through the attempt to obtain the "literal" interpretation.
For Congreve's characters in The Way of the World, equality of wit
works by exposing the construction of the presentation of self that is
supposed to dupe or disable the one to whom that construction is
presented. The displacement of that construction/ presentation of
self, by a sally of wit equal to it, reveals that the security of belief in
one's efficacy to dupe, and thus, to define one's singularity by that
ability, is misplaced. Thus, through an equality of wit, truth becomes
the performance of truth—the revelation of the "truth" of the other's
actions and intentions turns back upon itself when one wit exposes
the conceit of the other's wit. The idea of a necessarily mediated
truth (and the epistemological problem of self-reflexivity it engenders)
separates Congreve from the majority of dramatists who were his
contemporaries.
If Congreve refuses to adopt the "reform"
conventions surfacing at the time he is writing his plays, he also
refuses to focus on the learned or emergent morality of the "hero" as
a specific target of satire, as does Vanbrugh in The Relapse-, rather, he
takes the portrait of subjectivity and the (in)ability of self-reflection
to reform actions as his subject matter. In Congreve's aesthetic, to
adopt either of the two dramatic forms above is to engender the
forgetting of one's personal complicity before the appearance of truth;
it is to forget that, as Scandal puts it in Love for Love, "I know no
effectual Difference between continued Affectation and Reality"
Congreve's thought bears strong affinities with Emmanuel Levinas's work on ethics. As
Levinas states in "The Trace of the Other," "the heteronomous experience...would be an
attitude that cannot be converted into a category, and whose movement unto the other is not
recuperated in identification.'' {Deconstmction in Context: Literature and Philosophy^ Ed. Mark
C. Taylor, Chicago: University of ChicagD Press, 1986, 345-59): 348.
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(III.iii,262). Scandal's denomination is consistent with his statement,
and both are consistent with the to and fro movement of coruscation
as the scandal of truth: not "lying" but the inability to tell lie from
truth, fiction from reality, is the scandal of human existence.
This choice and presentation of subject matter has direct
consequences on the development of the plot. Unlike Wycherley's
Horner or Etherege's Dorimant, Congreve's Mirabell is not
necessarily in control of his own subjectivity. The events of the play
question consistently his ability to depend on his reading of the
situations in which he finds himself and to manipulate that reading
into action that achieves his ends. In effect, the plot continually
escapes him; he does little more than set the story in motion. Most
of the other characters have their designs included into the unfolding
of the story: Mirabell's plot (and the narrative line of the play) is the
motion of a number of characters rather than the motive of one
character brought to satisfaction by his own method. In act two
scene five, Millamant reminds him that he has already lost control
over where his own plot will travel:
Mira. Can you not find in the variety of your Disposition one
moment—
Milla. To hear you tell me Foible's Marry'd, and your Plot like
to speed-No.
Mira. But how came you to know it—
(374)
We are reminded of the irony of his inability to control the plot that
would satisfy his own motives when Foible admits to having
erroneously preempted his own use of the information (in the
conversation of II.v, as a tool to draw Millamant closer to him): "I
told her, Sir, because I did not know that you might find an
Opportunity" (II.vii,376). Similarly, when Mirabell tells Mrs. Fainall
the plot, he has no idea that she will graft onto the plot her own
ends. Mrs. Marwood also knows the plot and can use it to generate
her own story; as she states to Lady Wishfort, "I am sorry my Zeal
to serve your Ladiship and Family, should admit of Misconstruction,
or make me liable to Affront" (V.iv,426). Even Wishfort, when she
receives the letter from Mrs. Marwood, is aware of the plot. All of
the characters struggle to affect the self that will give them control
over the course the "plot" will take.
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The extent of other characters' participation in "Mirabell's" plot
is clear in the role that Foible and Waitwell have in it. It is they who
enact the plot;
they have to draw on their own resources to
manipulate the appearance of truth that will allow Mirabell to obtain
what he desires. For example, when Wishfort receives the letter from
Mrs. Marwood, they must shift the original plan and re-make the
plot. Before Mirabell's name appears in Foible's reading of the letter,
Foible and Waitwell must adopt a different posture and, by
adaptation, fit the event of the disclosure (Mrs. Marwood's reading of
the plot) as well as the original plan to yet another version of the
original plot:
Foib. Unfortunate, all's ruin'd.
Wait. Flow, how, let me see, let me see—reading, A Rascal and
disguis'd, and suhom'd for that Imposture,—O Villany! O
Villany!—^ the Contrivance of—
Lady. I shall faint, I shall die, oh!
Foib. Say, 'tis your Nephew's Fland.-Quickly, his Plot, swear,
swear it.—
\To him.
Wait. FFere's a Villain! Madam, don't you perceive it, don't
you see it? (IV.xv,419)
The plot escapes Foible, however, and she must use it to defend
herself before Lady Wishfort.
The extent to which the plot can escape any one character's
control is also clear when the drunkenness of Sir Wilfull spills into a
plot of its own as Petulant and Witwoud also become inebriated:
Mrs. Fainall. He's horridly Drunk—how came you all in this
Pickle?
Wit. A Plot, a Plot, to get rid of the Knight,—Your Husband's
Advice; but he sneak'd off. (IV.ix,412)
Significantly, this "plot" also leads to Millamant's joke on power:
when Wilfull asserts his traditionalist discourse on the relationship of
male/female power, Millamant retorts "Your Pardon, Madam, I can
stay no longer—Sir Wilfull grows very powerful. Egh! how he
smells" (IV.x,414).
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Given the significant characterization and plot divergences between
the plays of Congreve and Wycherley, Congreve and Etherege, and
Etherege and Wycherley, it is difficult to read Congreve's drama as a
return to, or of, previous formal characteristics; however, his drama
does employ certain formal elements of Wycherley and Etherege. For
example, his characters continue in the tradition of types, as suggested
by their names; also, there are elements of Loveit in Lady Wishfort,
Horner and Harcourt in Mirabell, Medley in Fainall. The theme of
age is not employed explicitly as a means for understanding elements
of the action; however, most of the participants are young. In
addition, the theme of town and country appears in The Way of the
World, although Congreve employs the theme of town/country
mores as a subtext (Sir Wilfull's relationship to Witwoud) to the
central exploration of the problem of subjectivity rather than as a
central organizational device that provides a dependable guide for
reading character.
Congreve suggests the unreliability of the
geographical metaphor as an indicator of character when Millamant
states, "I loathe the country and every thing that relates to it...I hate
the Town too" (IV.iv,404); however. Sir Wilfull, Witwoud, and
Petulant are clearly drawn from the conventional stock characters of
town/country character organization. If to the literary historian
Congreve does not present a simple return to earlier formal and
thematic concerns, neither does he represent a complete break from
those traditions. Such an understanding of Congreve's drama
accounts for Downes' and Dennis's differing readings of the audience's
initial reception. By Downes's account. The Way of the World was
"curiously Acted...[and] had not the success the company expected."'®
His next comment is suggestive: in attempting to account for the
"failure" of the play he considers it "too keen a Satyr" (95). If we
remember the common thread in the theory of satire in the
period—that satire was the voiding of experiential categories that yet
revealed the truth behind the lie—then Downes would be stating that
Congreve's Way of the World voided both its own stylistic precedents
and the conventional performative (or affective) meaning of satire
itself, to the extent that the audience could not respond. This view
of satire rejoins the voiding of experiential categories with Hume's
John Downes, Roscius Anglicanus (Ed. Judith Milhous and Robert D. Hume, London:
Society for Theatre Research, 1987): 95.
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theory of laughter in such a manner that satire loses much of its
ability to engender self-reflexivity in the audience. In any case,
Downes implies that the nature of the play is the reason for its
failure.
A somewhat different account is provided by Dennis, who felt that
"it was hiss'd by barbarous Fools in the Acting; and an impertinent
Trifle was brought on after it, with vast Applause."" Dennis's
account suggests that the culpability for the failure of the play rests
with the tastes of the audience, who refused to follow the play's
complexity of characterization. The play would have been considered
"curiously acted" precisely because it drew on recognizable,
conventional dramaturgical elements, and yet, the mode of
characterization was such that one could not depend on the
performance conventions—which are also audience members'
cognitive and emotive frameworks—to understand the characters or
the plot of the play.
The relationship among wit, humour, and Truth in Congreve's
dramaturgical aesthetic and The Way of the World suggests that to
understand both the plot and characters according to pre-existing
conventions—that is, according to conventions largely external to, if
seemingly present in, the drama—is largely to ignore the encounter
with the event of its presentation. A return to Gadamer can serve to
situate this problem in its rapproachment with history. As he notes,
"all encounter with the language of art is an encounter with an
unfinished event and is itself part of this event" (fruth and Method
99). This seems to have been Congreve's understanding of the way
of the world: neither he in his aesthetic theory nor any character in
his final play can claim control over the plot of time's progression.
The dialogic situation presents a movement of history that cannot be
understood as dialectical: "plot" is not necesarily an inherent
progression toward the realization of a unified form. Congreve's
preoccupation with the problem of understanding (audience reception)
and the novelty of dramatic form is evident in his dedication of The
Way of the World. In his discussion of Terence, he notes:

John Dennis, "Remarks Upon Mr. Pope's Translation of Homer" in Critical Works of John
Dennis, vol. II., ed. Edward Miles Hooker (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 1943, 115-58):
121-22,
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The purity of his Stile, the Delicacy of his Turns, and the
Justness of his Characters, were all of them Beauties, which the
greater Part of his audience were incapable of Tasting: some
of the coursest Strokes of Plautus, so severely censur'd by
Horace, were more likely to affect the Multitude; such, who
come with the expectation to laugh at the last Act of a Play,
and are better entertain'd with two or three unseasonable Jests,
than with the artful Solution of the Fable. (337-38)

Following the Gadamerian thrust of my own presentation, Congreve
sees the role of his drama as bringing this "pl^F)" what I have been
calling "the dialogic situation," into the structure, the formal
conventions, of the theatre; thus, the spectator should appreciate the
"artful Solution of the Fable," given the difficulty of reconciling
"play" with structure or form. Similarly, following The Way of the
World's "logic" of the dialogical formation of the social sphere, the
space of the theatre should not necessarily be conceived as a means to
represent pre-existing reality: as Congreve's dramaturgical theory
suggests, the path to such reality as well as the path to "true humour"
is by no means clear.But for those who would claim some control
over the plot of history, this drama, and theory of dramatuigy, must
be a fancy in the extreme sense of that word in Congreve's time:
literally, without reason.
To return to Gadamer: "The player [in our case the audience as well as the critic]
experiences the game as a reality that surpasses him. This is all the more the case where the
game is itself 'intended' as such a reality—for instance, the play which appears as presentation
for an audience'' (109, italics Gadamer's).

